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Policy Dilemmas for Controlling Child labor 
 
 
1.  The Dimensions of the Problem 
 
Starting from the early nineteenth century, when Britain began experimenting 
with policies to control child labor, we have learned a lot about policy interventions for 
controlling child labor. At the same time, the fact that child labor continues to be a major 
problem suggests that we may not have learned enough. The purpose of this essay is to 
show that this is one area where seemingly reasonable policy interventions can easily 
backfire. While the general possibility of pathological reaction to policy intervention will 
be discussed briefly, my aim here is to discuss one particular pathology in some detail 
because this is a problem that seems not to have been discussed in the literature and also 
because it provides a generic illustration of the hazard of using standard instruments for 
curbing child labor. 
  Thanks to improved data collection we now have a fair idea of the nature and 
extent of child labor in the world. According to data recently released by the ILO (2002), 
in the year 2000, there were 211 million children below the age of 15 years who were 
‘economically active’. Of these 73 million were below the age of 10; and the number 
goes up to 352 million if we consider children up to the age of 17 years. The ILO 
distinguishes ‘child labor’ from ‘economically active children’, by asserting that a child 
above the age of 12 who does light, part-time work that is not hazardous may be 
economically active but is not to be counted as a child laborer. By making this 
adjustment, and treating a child as someone below the age of 15, we find that in the year 
2000 there were 186 million child laborers the world over.  
  Evidently, the problem is large. And there are researchers who claim that it is 
larger than what the ILO statistics suggest. For one, the ILO finds that boys are more 
likely to be laborers than girls. This is quite consistent with official data from around the 
world and from 19
th century Britain, but in the few cases when data is collected with 
special attention given to include domestic work, as was done in India (see Cigno and 
Rosati, 2000), it turns out that girls do more work than boys. Hence, it is arguable that the   3
amount of girls work estimated by the ILO falls short of the true figure. Then there is the 
problem of ‘intermittent employment’. Analysts have for long suspected, and now we 
have formal statistics from Brazil showing that children are much more prone to being in 
and out of work than adults (Levison, Hoek, Lam and Duryea, 2002). Hence, if we try to 
find out how many children are working by simply tracking their work status during the 
previous week, as the ILO did, we get an underestimate of the number of children who do 
some work. Admittedly, this does not mean an underestimate of the amount of work done 
by children. But no matter which indicator one uses to describe the magnitude of labor 
performed by children, it must, by now, be amply clear that the phenomenon of child 
labor presents us with a staggeringly large policy problem.
1
 
2.  The Policy Problem 
 
  In crafting policy in the domain of child labor, one has, first of all, to be careful to 
guard against what is best described as the ‘fallacy of single-mindedness’. While for a 
child to have to work is undoubtedly bad, it is easy for us to forget that worse things can 
happen to a child than having to work. Hunger, serious illness, malnutrition, 
abandonment by family and prostitution are all states of being or activities from which a 
child would readily switch to regular labor. Thus, when we try to eliminate child labor, 
we must be careful so as not to achieve this by driving children to these worse 
alternatives. Policy-makers and even academics at times make the mistake of being so 
single-minded in their aim to control child labor that they do not mind if this is achieved 
by reducing the welfare of the children.  
Basu and Van (1998) had warned against this risk and shown that while there may 
indeed be occasions when a legal ban on child labor is called for, this is not always the 
case. In most people’s mind, an economist’s argument that we must not use legislative 
intervention somehow gets translated into the prescription that we must not use 
intervention. But that is a fallacy. There are economists and historians who have argued 
that child labor ought not to (and some believe it cannot) be removed by direct state 
                                                 
1 In Basu (1999), I have discussed how the magnitude of child labor in today’s world compares with the 
situation in 19
th century Britain.   4
intervention and that we will have to wait instead for the benefits of growth to trickle 
down and eventually eliminate child labor (e.g. Nardinelli, 1990). But to resist legal 
intervention (as I would in certain contexts) is not the same as resisting intervention. 
Indeed I would argue that the state has a great responsibility to improve the quality of 
schooling, give incentives such as school meals and improve adult labor market 
conditions, all of which are known to have a negative impact on the incidence of child 
labor (see, for instance, Ravallion and Wodon, 2000; Bourguignon, Ferreira and Leite, 
2003; Grootaert and Patrinos, 1998). When child labor is removed via interventions of 
this kind, we can generally be sure that this happens while enhancing the welfare of the 
child. Legal interventions, on the other hand, even when they are properly enforced so 
that they do diminish child labor, may or may not increase child welfare. This is one of 
the most important lessons that modern economics has taught us and is something that 
often eludes the policy maker.   
  The reason why child labor policy turns out to be intricate is because of the 
somewhat unusual factors that cause child labor in the first place. Child labor is 
intricately linked to poverty. Of the 186 million child laborers in the world virtually all 
are located in poor countries. In the same developing country, where lots of children 
work, one would rarely find the child of a doctor, lawyer, professor or any middle class 
person working. The evidence is overwhelming that poverty is a major cause of child 
labor (see, for instance, Edmonds, 2001)
2. 
  When this is true, policies can have counter-intuitive effects (see, for instance, 
Basu, 2000, Jafarey and Lahiri, 2002; Singh, 2002). The policy with which I shall here 
illustrate the risk of pathological reaction is one where a firm is fined a certain amount if 
it is found to be employing children. India’s Child Labor (Prohibition and Regulation) 
Act, 1986, has such a clause. Section 14 of this Act requires the government to charge a 
fine between Rs. 10,000 and Rs. 20,000 of a person or firm found employing children in 
contravention of the provisions of the Act (see Government of India, 1986).  
                                                 
2 It must be clarified that to say that poverty causes child labor is not to deny that child labor can have other 
causes, such as greater opportunity for child work, lack of schooling opportunity, parental illiteracy (see, 
for instance, Emerson and Souza, 2002; Bhalotra and Heady, 2003), just as a fire being caused by the 
carelessly discarded cigarette stub does not preclude the spilled kerosene on the floor from being a cause.   5
At first sight it appears that such a policy must cause child labor to decrease since 
firms will now be reluctant to employ children. However, it will be shown in this paper 
that in certain situations exactly the opposite is true. Imposing a fine for using child labor 
or raising an already-existing fine can increase the amount of child labor. What is 
interesting is that this argument carries over to a larger range of policies. This will be 
obvious as soon as the intuition behind the result is spelt out. This is done in the next 
section where the formal argument behind the intuition is also elaborated upon with the 
help of a simple diagram.  
 
3.  A Note on a Possible Pathology 
 
The reason why imposing a fine on firms for employing children can cause child 
labor to increase is intimately connected to the fact that poverty is a major cause of child 
labor. To see the intuition behind this, take the extreme case where a household chooses 
to send its children to work to escape extreme poverty or starvation
3. When child labor is 
the product of trying to reach a target (such as a subsistence consumption), any policy 
that makes child labor less effective an instrument in reaching such a target will result in 
a more intensive use of this instrument. Now if there is a new law whereby firms are 
fined whenever they are caught using child labor, clearly this will cause the wage rate for 
child labor to drop. This is because children are now a less attractive input from the point 
of view of firms. But this in turn will mean children will have to work even harder to be 
able to earn the target minimum income that they are after. 
  The full analysis is a bit more complicated. Note that, if the fines are made so big 
that the firms no longer wish to employ any children, of course, child labor will fall 
(whether this is desirable from a welfare-consequentialist point of view is another 
matter). The general result that is established here is that as the fine for using child labor 
is increased, child labor will first rise and then fall.  
The larger policy implications of this result are discussed after I have established 
it formally. The result that I am about to prove can be derived under fairly general   6
conditions but, since I wish to prove it without complex algebra, I shall use some strong 
simplifying assumptions. These assumptions are thus merely for reasons of expositional 
convenience. The assumptions that are more than mere simplifying ones and are central 
to my analysis are that (1) children are made to work only so as to achieve a certain target 
minimum consumption for the household and (2) child and adult labors are substitutes, 
subject to, possibly, an adult equivalency correction. Even these assumptions I am 
overstating for simplicity. We know, for instance, that when a relatively poor household 
comes to own more land (and this may be coincident with becoming a little richer), it 
tends to make its children work more (Bhalotra and Heady, 2003). This indicates that, 
while poverty is an important cause of child labor, it is not the sole cause. For instance, 
the ease with which a child can be employed, which no doubt increases as the 
household’s landownership increases, can influence the incidence of child labor (Basu 
and Tzannatos, 2003). While it is possible to take these complications on board and still 
derive the result I am about to derive, I shall here work with the more extreme 
assumptions as embodied in (1) and (2), to get the main argument across simply. 
Consider a labor market in which there are several households with each 
household consisting of one adult and several children. In the labor market adults and 
children are perfect substitutes. We could assume that a child can only do a fraction of 
what an adult does, but this complication would leave the results that this paper is 
focusing on unchanged and so is unnecessary. I shall assume that the adult always 
supplies labor perfectly inelastically, whereas children work only to the extent that this is 
necessary to achieve a subsistence level of consumption for the household. Let s be the 
amount of consumption that the household needs to subsist.  
From these assumptions it immediately follows that children will work only when 
adult wage is below s. Let w be the adult wage. If w exceeds s, subsistence consumption 
is achieved without requiring the children work. Note next that, given the above 
assumptions, if adult wage is w, the wage rate for a child laborer must also be w, since 
children and adults are perfect substitutes. If we allowed for the fact that children are less 
productive than adults child wage would be a fraction of w.     
                                                                                                                                                 
3 The analysis in this paper is not predicated on households taking the decision concerning child labor. The 
results go through even if child labor is an autonomous decision of the child, which is empirically not as   7
Let us now bring government into the picture. Suppose government announces 
that each time a firm is found employing a child the firm will be fined D rupees. For 
every child employed by a firm let p be the probability of the firm being caught. In that 
case for every child employed, the firm has an expected punishment cost of pD. Hence, 
unless child wage is less than adult wage by pD, it does not make sense for a firm to 
employ children. It follows that child wage, w’, must now be equal to w – pD.   
Therefore, child wage always moves in tandem with adult wage. As long as the 
legal regime remains unchanged (that is, p and d are unchanged), any change in adult 
wage will always be matched by the same change in child wage. In reality we expect 
child and adult wages to move in the same direction, since it stands to reason that child 
labor and adult labor are, by and large, substitutes. The stronger claim being made in this 
paper, namely, that they move fully in tandem, is merely a product of our simplifying 
assumptions, which in this context are however harmless. 
Next note that if w falls short of s, the household will send the children out to 
work. Let e be the number of children sent out to work. Since households send children to 
work only so as to be able to reach subsistence, it must be the case that e(w – pD) =         
s – w. Recall that w – pD equals child wage. Hence the term on the left is the total 
income earned by the children of the household. And this is equal to exactly the gap 
between subsistence need and adult income.  
It follows from this condition that as adult wage drops, the household will send 
more children to work (that is, as w drops e will rise). Of course, this cannot go on 
endlessly since after sometime the household will run out of children. Then onwards as w 
drops there will be no further increase is supply of child labor. These facts can be 
captured pictorially, as shown in Figure 1 where the vertical axis represents w (adult 
wage) and the horizontal axis represents labor. If w is above s, then only the adult will 
work. Hence, the labor supply curve will be vertical as shown by the segment AB. As w 
drops below s, the children go out to work, chasing the subsistence target. Hence, the 
backward bending segment BC.  As w keeps falling, as just argued, there will be a point 
beyond which there will be no more labor to supply. This explains the CF segment of the 
supply curve.  
                                                                                                                                                 
remote as some may have assumed (see Iversen, 2002).   8
 Finally observe that if as w keeps falling w – pD will eventually reach zero, that 
is, the child wage rate becomes zero. When that happens, making children work does not 
add to household consumption and so e will then fall back to zero and only the household 
adult will be working. Hence the supply curve of labor now reverts back to the GH 
segment. The full labor supply curve of labor is therefore given by ABCFGH. The sharp 
corners and angularity of the labor supply curve is caused by our simplifying 
assumptions. With more general assumptions the curve would smoothen out. But the 
main point is that it will have this basic feature of bulging out and then shrinking back 
again as the adult wage rate falls.  
  From the household supply curve to the aggregate supply curve simply entails 
aggregating horizontally the supply curve just derived. It will of course look the same as 
this curve, but for a horizontal magnification. We can therefore, without loss of 
generality, assume that this same curve is the aggregate supply curve of labor. So from 
now on we shall treat ABCFGH as the aggregate supply curve of labor in this economy. 
Many of the peculiarities of the child labor market with which the literature has 
been concerned, such as the possibility of multiple equilibria (Basu and Van, 1998; Basu, 
2002; Swinnerton and Rogers, 1999, Lopez-Calva, 2003) can be easily constructed by 
using this kind of supply characterization. But that is not the direction I wish to pursue 
here. To stay away from that, let me consider the case where the demand curve is 
sufficiently elastic so that there is only one equilibrium. This is illustrated by the demand 
curve for labor DD and the market equilibrium is given by the point E, where adult wage, 
w*, is below subsistence and there is a small incidence of child labor. 
  My concern here is with policy interventions and to show how there can be an 
adverse reaction to certain seemingly reasonable interventions. Consider the case where 
the government starting from the case illustrated in Figure 1 decides to raise the fine for 
employing children. (We could, also, think of a switch from no fines (D=0) to some 
positive fine.) Let the new fine be D’ and, we are assuming that D’ exceeds D. The effect 
of this on the supply curve of labor is easy to work out. It is obvious that the segment BC 
will move up, to BC’, as shown. To understand this suppose adult wage is fixed at w*. 
Clearly as the fine for child labor is raised, child wage will drop (otherwise firms will not   9
employ any children). Hence, each household will be forced to supply more children to 
the labor market in order to reach the subsistence target s. 
Keeping in mind that e cannot exceed the total available child labor and e will be 
zero if w is less than pD’, it is evident that the new supply curve of labor is given by 
ABC’F’G’H in Figure 1.  
  The important property to notice is that for some wage levels, namely, between s 
and pD’, the higher penalty for child labor increases the supply of child labor. And this 
leads to the pathological reaction that I discussed earlier, to wit, that child labor will 
increase as a consequence of a higher penalty for employing children: Observe that the 
new equilibrium is at E’, where adult wage (and, therefore, child wage) is lower and child 
labor is higher. 
  To trace the full range of possibilities, continue to raise D. Clearly child labor will 
rise, and then fall, eventually reaching zero. If, for instance, D is so high that pD exceeds, 
s, then, as is obvious from Figure 1, the supply curve of labor becomes a vertical line 
through point N and so child labor must be zero in equilibrium. To sum up, a small 
punishment for child labor may have quite the opposite effect of a large punishment.  
It is worth emphasizing once again that I have here not evaluated policy from the 
point of view of child welfare but simply by studying its effect on the incidence of child 
labor. And, as I have cautioned above and elsewhere in my writings, a decline in child 
labor need not always coincide with a rise in child welfare.  
  Before moving on, I must attend to one seeming difficulty with the above 
analysis. Since, as we have just shown, in some cases the child labor problem is made 
worse by the imposition of a fine for employing children, it seems natural to wonder if it 
would not be the case that the problem of child labor can be mitigated by subsidizing 
firms for employing children. The answer is no. A subsidy does not work like the reverse 
of a tax or a penalty. So it would clearly be wrong policy to reward firms for employing 
children.  
To see this we must understand something that was handled in the previous 
section by not explicitly talking about it. Suppose that a firm decides to use C units of 
child labor. Clearly it can do this by employing different numbers of children. It can, for   10
instance, employ 2C children with each child doing half-time work or C children with 
each child working full time and so on.  
In most models of economics, it does not matter how the total is broken up, and it 
is implicitly assumed that firms make each worker do full time work so that for C units of 
labor it uses C laborers. In the above model, with a penalty for every child that is found 
working in the firm, a firm will have a clear preference for employing as few children as 
possible, since each child brings with him or her a possible penalty.  So if the firm 
decides to have C units of child labor and gets this from n children, then the cost, child 
wage bill plus expected penalty, is given by w’C + npD. Clearly it will try to make n as 
small as possible; hence n will be C.  
The trouble with a subsidy for employing children is that this implicit assumption 
(which is valid when there is a fine associated with child labor) in the above model, 
breaks down. In the presence of a subsidy for each child employed it will be in the 
interest of the firms to get the same volume of labor from many children and take these 
children to the local government office as proof of child labor and collect the subsidy. In 
other words, to announce a subsidy would cause a fiscal crisis with firms making notional 
use of child labor and collecting money. 
 
4.  Concluding Remarks 
 
There has been a lot of discussion in the literature on what should be the right 
agency for controlling child labor. Should it be the national government or should it be 
some global body, such as the WTO or the ILO? Or should it be ordinary consumers, 
who discourage child labor by boycotting products made with child labor? There are 
indeed lots of complex issues involved in answering these questions, many mired in 
intricate matters of political economy and international law (see, for instance, Fung, 
O’Rourke and Sabel, 2001). Economists, like Bhagwati (1995), have rightly worried 
about empowering agencies such as the WTO, to which poor countries have inadequate 
access and which can quickly be converted to an instrument of Northern protectionism.  
Likewise, I have hesitation in turning this matter over to consumers in industrialized 
nations to exercise control through product boycotts, since this can also be an instrument   11
of protection and because we know—and Arthur Miller has immortalized this in drama--
how witch-hunts can come easily to the laity with a little egging on by interested lobbies 
(Basu, 2001). 
  But even apart from these larger questions of political economy, we need to 
contend with narrow economics questions concerning the kinds of instruments (whoever 
implements them) that ought to be used. Should we try to control child labor by offering 
free meals to children who go to school instead or should we control child labor by 
creating better schools?
4 Should we attempt to curb it by punishing the employers who 
employ children or parents who allow their children to be employed? And if we decide to 
do either, how much should the punishment be? Policy-makers, governments and 
international organizations often leave these matters at the level of sweeping exhortations 
to act. What this paper has tried to show with a simple example is that such exhortations, 
without closer commentary on exactly how we should act, may not be of much value and 
can even be counter-productive. 
  The formal exercise in this paper is undertaken not merely for its innate analytical 
interest but because it illustrates a general problem concerning policy for eradicating 
child labor. It shows that the design of good policy depends crucially on our 
understanding of what causes child labor. It depends, for instance, on whether child labor 
is caused by the simple urge to maximize consumption or the more limited, target-
oriented objective of trying to reach a subsistence income or minimal income that enables 
the child and the household to escape extreme poverty. If the latter is true, which, I 
believe, is often the case, then seemingly reasonable policies can have pathological 
reactions, exacerbating the problem of child labor. The paper is written in the hope that 
awareness of this problem will help us design better policies to put an end to this urgent 
problem of our times. 
                                                 
4 This is exactly the dilemma addressed by Jafarey and Lahiri (2002).   12
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